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Webs and Flows: Socionatural Networks and the
Matter of Nature at Peru’s Lake Paron
Adam French
Risk and Resilience Program, Advanced Systems Analysis Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
Geography and allied disciplines have long debated the ontological relationship between nature and society.
Although a binary perspective has historically predominated, recent decades have given rise to theories
transgressing the nature–society divide through nondualist conceptualizations of socionatures. Proponents of
actor-network theory (ANT) in particular have made the case for a nondualist approach focused on hybrid
socionatural networks. Yet some scholars working in critical traditions such as political ecology reject ANT
for reasons including insufficient attention to power and human intentionality. This article engages this
debate, arguing that ANT’s approach to socionatural networks is compatible with political ecology’s core
commitments and that drawing on ANT can help address enduring critiques of political ecology’s privileging
of the political and economic over the material. The article grounds its argument empirically by applying a
political–ecological network approach to a conflict rooted in the neoliberal subsumption of nature at Peru’s
Lake Paron. In documenting the historical dynamics of socionatural articulation within the Paron
waterscape, the case illustrates the potential of a network approach for understanding processes of assemblage
and hybridization in ways that emphasize their historical-materialist character and the emergent agency of
the social and natural—and socionatural—actors that they link. The article contends that such an approach
not only yields a more comprehensive and symmetrical understanding of agency but can also support more
just environmental governance by highlighting the contradictions between social reproduction and economic
production that underlie many socioenvironmental conflicts under capitalism. Key Words: actor-network
theory (ANT), hydrosocial systems, political ecology, resource conflict, water governance.
地理学和相关领域长期辩论自然与社会之间的本体论关系。尽管历史上盛行二元对立的观点, 但晚近数
十年则见证了通过非二元的社会自然概念化兴起的超越自然—社会分隔的理论。特别是行动者网络理论
（ANT）的提倡者, 更为聚焦混杂的社会自然网络之非二元对立方法提供了充分理由。但从事诸如社会
生态学等批判传统研究的若干学者, 却仍以未能充分关注权力和人类意向等理由拒绝 ANT。本文涉入此
一辩论, 主张 ANT 的社会自然网络方法与政治生态学的核心承诺相容, 且运用 ANT 能够有助于应对政
治生态学偏好政治与经济而非物质的长期批判。本文通过应用政治生态网络方法来处理深植于秘鲁帕龙
湖中有关自然的新自由主义次预设之冲突, 将此一主张植基于经验 。该案例在记录帕龙水景中的社会自
然接合的历史动态中, 阐述以网络方法理解凑组和混杂的过程之潜能, 该方法强调其历史物质特徵, 及其
所连结的浮现中的社会与自然之主体性、以及社会自然行的动者。本文主张, 此一方法不仅能对主体性
有更为全面且匀称的理解, 并且通过强调凸显资本主义中诸多社会环境冲突的社会再生产与经济生产之
间的矛盾, 能够支持更为公正的环境治理。关键词：行动者网络理论（ANT）, 水文社会系统, 政治生态学,
资源冲突, 水治理。
Durante mucho tiempo la geografıa y las disciplinas afines han debatido la relacion ontologica entre
naturaleza y sociedad. Aunque historicamente ha predominado una perspectiva binaria, en epocas recientes
han surgido teorıas que transgreden la divisoria naturaleza–sociedad por medio de conceptualizaciones no
dualistas de socionaturalezas. Los partidarios de la teorıa actor–red (ANT) en particular han propugnado por
un enfoque no dualista enfocado a redes socionaturales hıbridas. No obstante, algunos eruditos que trabajan
en tradiciones crıticas, tales como ecologıa polıtica, rechazan la ANT por razones que incluyen la atencion
insuficiente que prestan al poder y a la intencionalidad humana. Este artıculo se involucra en este debate
arguyendo que el enfoque de la ANT a las redes socionaturales es compatible con los compromisos centrales
de la ecologıa polıtica, y que basandonos en la ANT se pueden abocar crıticas perdurables a la ecologıa
polıtica por privilegiar lo polıtico y lo economico sobre lo material. El artıculo fundamenta empıricamente su
argumento aplicando un enfoque de red polıtico–ecologica a un conflicto arraigado en la subsuncion
neoliberal de la naturaleza en el Lago Paron del Peru. Documentando la dinamica historica de la articulacion
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socionatural dentro del paisaje hıdrico del Paron, el caso ilustra el potencial de un enfoque de redes para
entender los procesos de ensamble e hibridacion en maneras que enfatizan el caracter historico-materialista
de la agencia emergente de los actores sociales y naturales—y socionaturales—que ellos vinculan. El artıculo
sostiene que tal enfoque no solo genera un entendimiento mas comprensivo y simetrico de la agencia, sino
que puede igualmente dar su apoyo a una gobernanza ambiental mas justa destacando las contradicciones
entre la reproduccion social y la produccion economica que subrayan muchos conflictos socioambientales
bajo el capitalismo. Palabras clave: conflicto por recursos, ecologıa polıtica, gobernanza del agua, sistemas
hidrosociales, teorıa de actor–red (ANT).
We have mixed our labour with the earth, our forces
with its forces too deeply to be able to draw back and
separate either out. Except that if we mentally draw
back, if we go on with the singular abstractions, we are
spared the effort of looking, in any active way, at the
whole complex of social and natural relationships
which is at once our product and our activity.
—Williams (1980, 83)
More supple than the notion of system, more historical
than the notion of structure, more empirical than the
notion of complexity, the idea of network is the
Ariadne’s thread of these interwoven stories.
—Latour (1993, 3)
O
n 29 July 2008, before the sun crested the gla-
ciated summits of Peru’s Cordillera Blanca,
residents from the Cruz de Mayo campesino
community and the city of Caraz ascended the long
dirt road to Lake Paron. Other mornings, some might
have made this same trip to clean irrigation canals or
shuttle foreign mountaineers hoping to scale the
peaks ringing the lake basin. That morning, however,
they were on their way to banish one of the world’s
largest energy corporations from their lake by evicting
a lone technician who managed the hydraulic valves
controlling Lake Paron’s outflow.
With their task accomplished, some of the coalition
remained to guard the discharge-control station, as
others descended to block the access road.
Meanwhile, a diverse crowd—from schoolchildren to
community elders—assembled in Caraz to proclaim
their right to the lake that had long been a critical
water source and cultural symbol in the region but
that a decade earlier had fallen under foreign
control. This coordinated resistance came only after
years of appeals to authorities had effected too little
change in the company’s management of the
lake. Since Lake Paron’s occupation, nine years
have elapsed; although the conflict has calmed, it
remains unresolved.
This article analyzes the Paron conflict through
a political–ecological lens, highlighting how social
and biophysical factors have interacted to drive the
conflict’s emergence and persistence in a context
of incompatible strategies of resource access and
control. Viewed in this way, the case underscores
the governance challenges ensuing from nature’s
neoliberalization: economic reforms disembed a vital
resource from its existing sociocultural context,
generating social resistance through a Polanyian
double movement (Polanyi [1944] 2001). By detail-
ing these dynamics, the article contributes to polit-
ical ecology’s rich scholarship on neoliberal natures
and responds to the call for “more robust ethno-
graphic accounts of the complex and place-based
sets of practices through which particular actors
have produced, reproduced, and challenged these
novel modes of governance” (Himley 2008, 445).
Although providing a thorough empirical account
is a central goal of the article, my principal theoret-
ical interest lies in contributing to the enduring
debate over the potential for productive engagement
between political ecology and actor-network theory
(ANT; see, e.g., Castree 2002; Lave 2015b), particu-
larly the strain of ANT associated with the work of
Latour (1993, 2005). Specifically, I aim to illustrate
the value of ANT’s network conceptualizations for
understanding processes of socionatural assemblage
and hybridization in ways that recognize both their
historical materialist character and the emergent
agency of the social and natural (and socionatural)
actors they link.1 In stark contrast to the recent
suggestion that we should “retire ANT as a core
element of the political ecology toolkit” due to
incompatibilities with the field’s core commitments
and because “we have nothing to lose but our
networks” (Lave 2015b, 221), I argue that careful
attention to socionatural networks can help
strengthen political ecology’s fundamental commit-
ments to elucidating the vital character of nonhu-
man nature in political–economic dynamics and to
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supporting more just and sustainable environmen-
tal governance.
In conceptualizing socionatural networks, I follow
Rocheleau and Roth’s (2007) suggestion that we
understand them “as relational webs shot through
with power,” while broadening our “notions of power
to incorporate the biophysical, material dimensions
of these relationships” (434). This approach makes
explicit “the ontological reality of those entities we
term ‘natural,’ and the active role those entities play
in making history and geography” (Castree 1995,
13) through a shift toward a more symmetrical and
relational understanding of agency that avoids the
excesses of both social constructionism and environ-
mental determinism. Put differently, careful histor-
ical analysis of these relational webs aids in
understanding how “agency becomes an emergent
property of network associations rather than a prop-
erty inherent in discrete entities,” either social or
natural (Bakker and Bridge 2006, 19).
I contend that this focus on the historical dynam-
ics of actor articulation within network topologies
makes the interactions and hybridizations that struc-
ture our worlds more comprehensible. For although
network conceptualizations begin from and, to a
degree, maintain the nature–society binary that non-
dualist framings reject, they also provide a more
dynamic and imaginable terrain of socionatural
melding than alloys like Haraway’s (1991) cyborgs
and Latour’s (1993) quasi-objects. Moreover, these
latter conceptualizations risk conveying a sense of
amalgamation that can misrepresent the incomplete
fusions and multiactor assemblages intrinsic to many
socionatural systems. They also remain, I believe,
too ontologically challenging to gain much traction
in the public imagination,2 whereas networks are a
ubiquitous aspect of contemporary life and thought.
In an applied sense, I also argue—contrary to
critiques of ANT’s normative indifference—that a
political–ecological network approach can support
more just and sustainable environmental governance
in at least two ways. First, through detailed attention
to the socionatural metabolisms through which
both social reproduction and economic production
occur, a network approach helps to illuminate the
competing and contradictory dimensions of these
processes that often drive conflicts and distributional
inequities over resource access and control. Second,
understanding nature as an active component of
socionatural systems rather than a passive substrate
is fundamental to moving beyond an entrenched
Prometheanism regarding the nonhuman—a shift
ever more critical as we increasingly confront the
diverse impacts of global change.3
The case study in which I ground my argument is
based on fieldwork conducted in Peru from 2009 to
2017, with intensive data collection from 2010 to
2012 and several shorter research periods in 2009 and
from 2013 to 2017. This work has included numerous
and repeat interviews with diverse participants in the
conflict and its resolution process (e.g., members and
advisors of the local coalition, current and past
employees of Duke Energy, and representatives of
multiple government ministries and agencies). I have
also undertaken participant observation in several
dozen meetings and technical inspections related to
the conflict, and I have studied the formal, written
proceedings (actas) of many other such meetings.
Additionally, I have collected and analyzed varied
materials relevant to the case, including technical
assessments and reports; hydrologic and climatic data
and lake-level monitoring records; national- and
local-level legislation, policies, and legal rulings; press
releases and public and private correspondence
between parties; and media coverage.4
The article is structured as follows. The next sec-
tion examines select developments within critical
political economy, political ecology, and ANT for
conceptualizing nature–society dynamics and nature’s
agency and considers prior examples and further
potential for linking these approaches in the analysis
of socionatural systems. In the third and fourth sec-
tions, I apply a political–ecological network perspec-
tive to the empirical analysis of the Paron conflict’s
emergence and persistence. In the concluding sec-
tion, I reflect on the value of this approach and
argue for maintaining ANT within political ecology’s
conceptual toolkit.
Socionatural Networks and the Matter of
Nature in Capitalism
Almost three decades ago, Fitzsimmons (1989)
noted that, despite the discipline’s “deep roots” in
the topic, most work in critical geography showed a
“peculiar silence” on the matter of “social Nature:
the geographical and historical dialectic between
societies and their material environments” (106).
Today this silence is hard to fathom, because critical
approaches to nature–society dynamics are a pillar of
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human geography and the central focus of political
ecology. This section considers a selection of the
scholarship that has emerged in these areas over
recent decades, focusing specifically on work con-
cerned with materiality and the agency of nature
within the dynamics of late capitalism.
Marx was explicit about the central role of nature
in social and economic reproduction—both in the
longue duree of human history and in the rise of cap-
italism (Marx [1867] 1967). Nevertheless, Marx’s
work is often critiqued for a Prometheanism that
“under-represents the significance of non-mani-
pulable natural conditions of labour processes and
over-represents the role of human intentional trans-
formative powers vis-a-vis nature” (Benton 1989,
64). “Green” Marxists have responded extensively
to this critique (Castree 1995), looking both theoret-
ically and empirically at sectors like industrial
agriculture to detail how material conditions
present obstacles as well as opportunities for capital
accumulation (e.g., Mann and Dickinson 1978;
Henderson 1999). Focusing on capitalist dynamics
broadly, O’Connor (1988) proposed an ecological
Marxism that turns on a “second contradiction”
(19), wherein continuous degradation of the
“conditions of production” (11) on which capital-
ism’s growth is based generates eventual crisis.
Similarly, rejecting both “epistemic conservatism”
and “social-constructionist utopianism,” Benton
(1989, 78) argued for a reconceptualization of labor
processes that views the “complex patterns of
enablement and constraint that are built into all
forms of human interaction with nature … as a
function of the articulated combination of specific
social practices and specific complexes of natural
conditions, resources and mechanisms” (78–79).
Building on such work, Boyd, Prudham, and
Schurman (2001) drew an analogy to the distinction
between the formal and real subsumption of labor
(Marx [1867] 1967) to develop a framework for
examining how the “problem of nature” is handled
by specific industrial sectors. In their framework,
nature’s formal subsumption corresponds to extract-
ive industries in which firms must confront nature’s
materiality and “adjust their production strategies to
address the exigencies,” whereas real subsumption
occurs within biologically based industries where
“systematic increases in or intensification of bio-
logical productivity” allow nature to be “(re)made
to work harder, faster, and better” (Boyd, Prudham,
and Schurman 2001, 562–64). Despite the heuristic
value of this framework, varied socionatures—includ-
ing the hydropeaking regime at Lake Paron described
later—challenge such clear-cut categorization
(Sneddon 2007), because eco-regulatory approaches
typical of real subsumption proliferate across bio-
logically and nonbiologically based sectors.
Over recent decades, the “neoliberalization” of
nature has provided abundant material for political
ecological analysis (see, e.g., McCarthy and Prudham
2004; Himley 2008; Bakker 2010).5 Much of this
work draws on the scholarship outlined earlier and
other influential theories of nature in political econ-
omy (e.g., Polanyi [1944] 2001; Smith 1984; Harvey
1996) to critique nature’s commodification and
linked processes of resource dispossession, examining
empirically how various industries place “social
reproduction and the reproduction of the market
(and capital) in tension over competing demands on
biophysical nature” (Prudham 2004, 346). Given its
focus on specific industrial metabolisms, this research
often carefully considers materiality by examining
how it both complicates and enables nature’s eco-
nomic subsumption (see Bakker and Bridge 2006;
Braun 2008).6 Yet much of this work is nevertheless
critiqued for an “overly constrained view of agency,”
resulting from an implicit reliance on “a humanist
view of the subject, and an associated anthropocen-
tric conception of political subjectivity” (Bakker
2010, 717). Such perspectives tend to restrict agency
to the realm of human intention, viewing the econ-
omy as “an already constituted structural unity that
only subsequently comes into contact with a recalcitrant
non-human nature” rather than recognizing how nat-
ural forces “shape or reconfigure the landscape of
capitalism” from the outset (Braun 2008, 669). This
critique resonates with broader concerns over polit-
ical ecology’s enduring tendency to privilege the pol-
itical and economic over the ecological (Walker
2005; Lave 2015a). To address these critiques, polit-
ical ecology can and should do more to explain how
and why the matter of nature really matters in these
processes, not just as input or backdrop but as con-
stitutive participant.
Toward Symmetrical Agency
One theoretical tack for moving toward more
active conceptions of nonhuman nature can be seen
in geographic work coupling political–economic
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analysis with elements of ANT. For advocates of this
union, “ANT goes beyond attentiveness to the
material foundation of human action” through its
premise that “agency is always a collective, net-
worked outcome, performed by nondualist sociomate-
rial associations” (Goodman 2001, 193). This
perspective on agency requires a symmetrical
approach that privileges neither social nor natural
forces a priori but instead considers how power
emerges within “relentlessly heterogeneous” sociona-
tural networks (Murdoch 1997b, 332). ANT thus
challenges Promethean perspectives on nature by
decentering power through a relational understanding
of agency that includes as an agent “any entity which
can link together others in networks” (Murdoch
1997a, 747). Understanding how agency emerges in
particular contexts therefore requires detailed descrip-
tion of specific network dynamics without relying on
preassumed social categories or motivations for
explanatory power (Latour 1993). As Castree (2002)
observed, “ANT refuses to look for causes lying out-
side socionatural networks” and “refuses the presump-
tion that different networks are driven by the same
general processes or factors, be they ‘capital’ or ‘class
interests’ for example” (118–19).
Such perspectives challenge the structural pre-
sumptions of much critical political economy, leading
to criticisms that ANT’s symmetrical approach ultim-
ately undermines social critique through normative
distance and a disavowal of the importance of human
intentionality (Pickering 1993; Murdoch 1997a). For
many critics, the failure to grapple with social inten-
tionality, in particular, overlooks how human actions
drive the creation and modification of many sociona-
tural networks and underestimates how nature’s
agency often emerges in relation to socioeconomic
forces (Harvey 1996). Attention to human intention-
ality is undoubtedly vital to understanding how and
why social actors enroll nature in specific networks,
as well as the degree to which natural forces give rise
to, enable, and disrupt social intentions.
Acknowledging social intentionality does not, how-
ever, necessitate denying agency to natural actors but
instead requires recognizing that processes driving
actor networks “are social and natural but not in
equal measure … and that power, while dispersed,
can be directed by some (namely specific ‘social’
actors) more than others” (Castree 2002, 135).
Latour (1993) himself underscored these dynamics
when he stated, “The principle of symmetry aims not
only at establishing equality … but at registering dif-
ferences—that is, in the final analysis, asymmetries—
and at understanding the practical means that allow
some collectives to dominate others” (107–08).
Contrary to imposing normative distance, this
approach can aid in understanding—and confront-
ing—injustice and domination by “disentangling the
filaments which support the nodes of power”
(Goodman 2001, 195; Whatmore 2002).
Although geographers have engaged with ANT
too extensively to detail here (for reviews see
Goodman 2001; Castree 2002; Braun 2008;
Lave 2015b), several examples lay important ground-
work for a political–ecological network approach.
Sundberg (2011), for example, in what she termed
posthumanist political ecology, showed how agency
becomes a “collective performance, rather than the
product of individual intention” (332) within histor-
ically contingent collectives of humans and nonhu-
man nature at the U.S.–Mexico border (e.g., federal
agents, thorn scrub, and felines). Similarly, research
on irrigation (Birkenholtz 2009) and drinking
water (Sultana 2013) in India analyzes how social
relations are embodied and transformed in networks
formed around tubewells, which link actors including
humans, technological artifacts, and institutions
as well as groundwater and its contaminants.
Blending political ecology and ANT explicitly, such
approaches highlight agency’s emergence within spe-
cific histories of network creation, an insight shared
with earlier research on hybrid waterscapes.
Waterscapes and Hydrosocial Flows
The articulating fluidity and metabolic importance
of water makes it a vital actor in many socionatural
networks, and ANT has significantly influenced
geographic scholarship on the “hydrosocial” dynamics
of water use and governance. A seminal example is
Swyngedouw’s (1999) work on the early twentieth-
century Spanish “waterscape,” which draws explicitly
on Latour to conceptualize the waterscape as
a socionatural hybrid “that embodies a multiplicity of
historical-geographical relations and processes” in
ways that “express nature and society and weave net-
works of infinite liminal spaces” (445). Moreover,
Swyngedouw (1999) argued that “following the maze
of socionature’s networks—as Latour (1993) suggests
we do—is not good enough if stripped from the pro-
cess of their historical-geographical production” (447).
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Figure 1. Aerial photograph of Lake Paron and the upper reaches of the Paron–Llullan watershed. Source: Direccion de Vigilancia y
Reconocimiento Aereo de la Fuerza Aerea del Peru (National Aerophotographic Service of Peru).
Figure 2. The Santa River watershed, Peru.
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In other words, detailed description is insufficient
without attention to the historical and material
dynamics that continuously configure networks in
ways transcending the nature–society divide. As
Swyngedouw illustrated, these hybrid networks might
highlight social intentions but always in relation to
natural forces and processes.
Many geographers have followed Swyngedouw’s
ANT-inspired attention to hydrosocial dynamics
through an analytical focus “envision[ing] the circu-
lation of water … as a hybridized socionatural flow
that fuses together nature and society in inseparable
manners” (Swyngedouw 2009, 56; see, e.g., special
issues introduced by Bear and Bull 2011; Budds,
Linton, and McDonnell 2014; Boelens et al. 2016).
Notably, this work rarely draws on ANT explicitly
(Loftus 2011), perhaps due to the aforementioned
perceptions of incompatability with the structural
and dialectical approaches dominant in much hydro-
social theorizing (e.g., Lave 2015b). Whatever the
rationale, I believe the this elision of ANT’s influ-
ence on hydrosocial conceptualizations neglects a
formative element of this scholarship and overlooks
important conceptual insights ANT has to offer.
In an effort to recognize and extend ANT’s con-
tributions to hydrosocial research, in the following
case study I link ANT’s approach to networks and
agency with political ecology’s critical attention to
history and power to examine the evolution of the
Paron conflict. The analysis illustrates how social
and natural actors have interacted and hybridized
over time to coproduce and transform the network
that shapes the hydrology as well as the political
economy and governance of the Paron waterscape
and its flows. Through attention to the constitutive
roles of both materiality and science and technology
in these dynamics, the approach responds to con-
cerns over how political ecology “has increasingly
distanced itself from the environmental sciences and
from consideration of the physical characteristics of
the landscapes it studies” (Lave 2015a, 572).
Additionally, this work complements and advances
interdisciplinary research on hydrosocial systems in
Andean Peru (e.g., Bury et al. 2013; Mark et al.
2017), and on Lake Paron specifically (Carey 2010;
Carey, French, and O’Brien 2012), through detailed
analysis of the political economy of regional water
governance as well as through heightened attention
to socionatural hybridization and the complexity of
agency in these networked processes.
The Lake Paron Waterscape
Lake Paron is the largest of more than 1,800
lakes in the Cordillera Blanca—the planet’s highest
and most extensively glaciated tropical mountain
range (Glaciology and Hydrologic Resources Unit
2011; see Figure 1).7 Impounded behind a glacial
moraine at 4,200 meters above sea level (masl), the
lake collects precipitation and glacial melt from a
42-km2 watershed8 to form the headwaters of the
Paron–Llullan River, which descends over 20 km
and 2,000 vertical meters to a confluence with the
Santa River at the city of Caraz (Figure 2). The
lake’s outflow has long been vital to local
agriculture and water supplies, particularly during
the annual dry season (May–October) when little
precipitation falls. Currently, these flows provide
water to more than 2,300 local irrigators and more
than 20,000 residents of Caraz (Local Water
Authority 2010).
Since the early twentieth century, however,
diverse actors from beyond the hydrographic bounda-
ries of the Paron–Llullan watershed have contributed
to the transformation of the lake and its waterscape.
Within this dynamic network, human actors and
hydrologic and biophysical conditions have become
linked in ways that illustrate both the importance of
human intentionality in the creation of socionatures
and the emergent agency of nature in enabling and
defying its subsumption for human gain.
Histories of Water as Resource and Risk
The socionatural network at Lake Paron must be
understood in the broader context of the Santa
River waterscape to which the lake is linked. Fed by
precipitation and glacial melt from the Cordillera
Blanca, the Santa River has the second largest
watershed (12,000 km2) and most consistent
annual discharge of all the rivers on Peru’s Pacific
slope (Bury et al. 2013). Given the aridity of Peru’s
coastal plain, these perennial flows have made the
river pivotal in regional development schemes.
In 1906, for example, coastal agriculturalists began
lobbying for the Santa’s diversion northward for
irrigation around Trujillo (Landeras 2004). In 1913,
Peruvian engineer Santiago Antunez de Mayolo pro-
posed a hydropower plant along the Santa’s middle
reaches in the remote Ca~non del Pato gorge
(Antunez de Mayolo 1957). Influenced by the
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engineer’s 1912 visit to Norway’s energy and fertil-
izer production facility at Rjukan, this integrated
plan finally came to fruition in 1958, linking hydro-
power to steel production at the port of Chimbote
(Sotelo 1982). Paron and other highland lakes
played an important role in such plans for their cap-
acity to provide water reserves during dry periods.
Transformation of Paron’s waterscape, however,
was first driven by fears of disaster rather than devel-
opmental visions. Here also the Santa waterscape is
critical, because it is one of the planet’s regions most
susceptible to glacier-related hazards (Carey 2010). In
the 1940s, fear of a catastrophic glacier lake outburst
flood (GLOF) downstream of Lake Paron intensified
after a nearby lake’s morainal dam failed in 1941,
unleashing a GLOF that killed 5,000 people and
destroyed much of the city of Huaraz.9 After this dis-
aster, Caraz residents demanded risk reduction at
Paron, even petitioning the Peruvian president to
drain the lake in 1945 (Carey 2010). These pressures
grew in 1950 when a GLOF originating two canyons
north of Paron destroyed much of the nearly com-
pleted Ca~non del Pato hydroelectric plant (CDPHP)
and again in 1951 when Lake Paron itself nearly over-
flowed its dam after a series of small GLOFs entered
the lake from a tarn upstream in the Paron basin.
The combination of nearby glacier-related disasters,
uncertainty about the stability of Paron’s morainal
dam, and the exposure of downstream populations
and infrastructure to GLOF hazard drew a variety of
new actors into the Paron waterscape. These actors
included not only alarmed citizens and the public offi-
cials they lobbied to control the lake but also the sci-
entists and engineers called on to conduct analyses
and risk mitigation. Paron’s role as both a hydrologic
resource and a potentially lethal hazard made the pol-
itical dynamics around the lake particularly complex,
with some actors demanding its drainage, whereas
others argued for its preservation (Carey 2010). A
number of cursory, and at times conflicting, technical
risk assessments added uncertainty to this complexity.
Finally, in 1967, after more than two decades of
debate, a team of French scientists led by the
respected glaciologist Louis Lliboutry was contracted
to evaluate the dangers at the lake.
Gauging and Controlling Nature’s Latent Power
The 1967 study detailed the geophysical processes
that could generate a GLOF at Paron. These
included seismic activity that might cause liquefac-
tion or erosion of the morainal dam, unstable fossil
ice within the moraine, or the overtopping of the
dam as a result of wave action caused by rockfall or
a GLOF in one of the smaller lakes upstream—as
had nearly occurred in 1951 (Lliboutry, Post, and
Pautre 1967). This analysis underscored the latent
power of the natural components of the lake’s water-
scape, and despite the fact that these natural “actors”
had long been present, their agency only emerged
through documentation by credible experts.
Although the French scientists did not predict the
probability of the dam’s failure, they felt that the risks
warranted the lake’s immediate drainage to further
analyze the dam’s stability. Notably, their study also
extended the debate over the lake’s role as a water
resource by suggesting that the stability assessment
should determine the feasibility of using Paron as a
regulating reservoir for the CDPHP, which in 1967
was in the process of doubling its generating capacity
from 50 to 100MW (Duke 2013).
Peruvian policymakers quickly approved the lake’s
drainage, but rather than risk destabilizing the dam
by excavating a spillway in the moraine—as had
been accomplished at several smaller Cordillera
Blanca lakes—a 1.2-km tunnel would be drilled in
the granite mountainside forming the lake’s right
bank. This complex and costly project began in 1968.
After an array of technical and financial setbacks and
the involvement of actors ranging from expert navy
divers to a Swiss mathematician, the tunnel was finally
completed in 1984 (Carey 2010). Over 1984 and
1985, the lake level was lowered by 45m as 58 106
m3 of water was discharged (S&Z 1986).
The dam’s evaluation further expanded the role of
engineers and science within the Paron waterscape. It
included analysis of bathymetric, meteorological, and
hydrologic data for the basin; collection of core sam-
ples from the moraine; and monitoring of the water
table and stability of the lake’s shorelines during drain-
age at variable discharge rates (S&Z 1986). These
methods determined that the lake’s moraine was well
consolidated and free of fossil ice, that the shorelines
were stable, and that seepage through the moraine
diminished as the water level dropped below 4,190m.
Analysis of historic water availability and demand
suggested that the lake could annually provide suffi-
cient water for local needs (18 106 m3) while
contributing a significant volume to the CDPHP
(27 106 m3; S&Z 1986). The engineers thus
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concluded that the lake could effectively serve as a
regulating reservoir under specific operat-
ing conditions.
These guidelines included maintaining the lake’s
maximum surface level at 4,185 masl, which would
limit the total volume to 54 106 m3 and leave 15m
of freeboard between the water surface and the dam’s
highest point to absorb impacts related to rockfall or
an upstream GLOF. The intake for the discharge tun-
nel would be constructed at 4,155 masl, providing
36 106 m3 of storage capacity. Notably, there was
no recommendation for a maximum discharge rate in
cubic meters per second; instead, the engineers sug-
gested that the lake’s surface level should be lowered
by a maximum of 20 cm per day to assure the contin-
ued stability of the shorelines and dam. With these
guidelines established, all that remained to convert
the lake to a managed reservoir was the reinforcement
of the drainage tunnel and the installation of dis-
charge-controlling hydraulic valves. These final steps
were completed by 1992 and, in infrastructural terms,
Lake Paron was integrated into the CDPHP system.
Lake Paron’s Formal Subsumption by the Energy Sector
Although the original rationale for “controlling”
Paron had been risk reduction, there was also a
strong profit incentive for incorporating the lake
into the national energy grid. In 1990, Electroperu—
the state energy company that owned the CDPHP—
estimated that water from the lake would generate
an additional $3 million per year in revenue (Carey,
French, and O’Brien 2012). Part of this financial
benefit was linked to the fact that Paron’s water is
clean, bearing little sediment in comparison to many
other Santa River tributaries. As a result, its use at
the CDPHP saves expensive erosive wear to the
steel paddles that drive the plant’s turbines (Oca~na
2011). More crucial, however, was the fact that
Paron’s volume could be stored and released stra-
tegically during the annual dry season when the
Santa River drops to levels insufficient to generate
at the CDPHP’s full capacity.
To formalize Paron’s use by the energy sector, a
state-granted water license was awarded to
Electroperu in late 1994 (Ministry of Agriculture
[MINAG] 1994b). The license established a right to
discharge 35 106 m3/year—practically the entire
usable volume of the lake—at rates up to 8 m3/sec,
which was more than three times the historical
average maximum discharge (2.55 m3/sec) from the
lake between 1953 and 1983 (S&Z 1986).10 To pro-
vide for local irrigation and potable water needs, the
license also required a permanent discharge of at
least 1 m3/sec.
Despite the transformation of the lake’s discharge
regime that the license permitted, there was no envir-
onmental impact analysis (EIA) conducted prior to
its approval. This lack of an EIA contradicted energy-
sector regulations passed earlier in 1994 (Ministry of
Energy and Mines [MEM] 1994)11 and was particu-
larly surprising given the lake’s location within
Huascaran National Park, one of Peru’s flagship parks
and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Even more
unusual was the fact that days after the granting of
Electroperu’s license, a state land registry titled 540
hectares of the national park, including Lake Paron
and its watershed, to the energy company (French
2016). Eventually acknowledged by authorities as a
titling “error,” this land transfer did not draw public
attention until years later when, as we will see later,
it would come to play an important role in the con-
flict over Paron.12
The conversion of Paron to a managed compo-
nent in the regional energy system significantly
restructured the waterscape by linking diverse new
actors to the lake and its flows. The most directly
influential of these actors was Electroperu, who
owned and operated both the CDPHP and Lake
Paron’s discharge infrastructure. As a node in
Electroperu’s network, the lake was connected to the
regional energy grid and its expansive web of electri-
city producers and consumers. These included grow-
ing numbers of residential users, large coastal
industries like steel and fishmeal producers, and a
reinvigorated and expanding mining sector in the
Andean highlands (Duke 2013).
This network would further expand after 1996, as
neoliberal reforms privatized the entire CDPHP system
through sale to the consortium Egenor (MEM 1996).
In this process, the water license and property title for
Paron were transferred directly from Electroperu to
Egenor (MINAG 1996). Then, from 1999 to 2001, a
subsidiary of U.S.-based Duke Energy consolidated
control of Egenor and its holdings to become a central
actor in the Santa and Paron waterscapes (Duke
2002). This privatization process created new, if indir-
ect, links between the lake’s waters and an increas-
ingly diverse and distant array of social actors.
Although neither Duke’s international executives or
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shareholders nor the Andean irrigators depending dir-
ectly on the lake were likely aware of each other’s
connections to Paron’s flows, these actors had become
articulated through the Paron waterscape, with each
group gaining power to affect the other’s interests.
As these political–economic networks expanded,
the agential reach of the lake and its flows also
grew. With the lake’s conversion to a reservoir and
the privatization of control over its outflow, the
socionatural network at Paron took on new powers
to enhance and impede national development and
international profits. In this context, the lake’s flows
became an outcome of increasingly intricate hybrid-
ization. Their abundance and intensity were no lon-
ger determined by interacting geophysical factors
such as precipitation, glacial melt, streambed gradi-
ent, and soil saturation but were instead dictated by
the hydraulic valves at the tunnel intake, which
could shift at a moment’s notice with fluctuations in
the value of a megawatt-hour of electricity or with
the energy demand at the Chimbote steel mill.13
Toward the Real Subsumption of Lake Paron
As part of its privatization contract, Egenor agreed
to increase generating capacity at the CDPHP from
150MW to 240MW (Duke 2001). This expansion
would require additional water from the Santa and
improved infrastructure to handle these larger vol-
umes. Between 1998 and 1999, the corporation built
a new, reinforced intake and renovated the plant’s
six pairs of turbines. With each turbine group requir-
ing 12 m3/sec of flow, the plant used 72 m3/sec of
river water when generating at full capacity, and
Peruvian authorities increased the company’s water
allocation from 48 m3/sec to 79 m3/sec (MINAG
1999). This legal allocation alone did little good
during the annual dry season, however, when Santa
River base flows often drop to 35 m3/sec or less at
the CDPHP intake (National Water Authority
[ANA] 2009b).14
Under dry-season conditions, expanded power gen-
eration required additional water in the river, flows
most readily available from highland lakes like Paron.
As noted earlier, Duke’s water license for Paron per-
mitted the discharge of up to 8 m3/sec. Once released,
this water traveled approximately eight hours to reach
the plant’s turbines, during which an estimated 20
percent was lost to evaporation, filtration, and
upstream uses.15 Thus, although a substantial addition
to the Santa’s dry-season base flow, Paron’s contribu-
tion at the CDPHP was insufficient to power even
one additional turbine group during the several hours
each evening when energy demand—and its market
price—was typically highest.
Maximizing generating capacity during these peri-
ods of peak demand required storing large volumes
of water close to the CDPHP’s intake to be released
strategically through a process known as hydropeak-
ing. In 2001, Duke enhanced its hydropeaking cap-
acity at the CDPHP by constructing a 684,000-m3
regulating-reservoir system on an alluvial plain
upstream of the plant’s intake. This new element in
the waterscape, the San Diego Reservoir, allowed
Duke to divert water from the Santa during periods
of lower energy demand to fill two linked holding
ponds. This water could then be emptied back into
the Santa at a rate of up to 50 m3/sec, more than
doubling the river’s average minimum dry-season
flow at the intake (35 m3/sec) and supporting gen-
eration at or near full capacity during peak hours
throughout much of the dry season.16 Lake Paron,
meanwhile, provided critical water to speed San
Diego’s daily recharge, enabling more consistent gen-
eration at the CDPHP for the sustained demand of
users like factories and mines (Oca~na 2011).
This system capable of responding to peak energy
demand in virtually real time shifted the use of Lake
Paron and the Santa’s flows at the CDPHP away
from the formal subsumption characterizing a basic
run-of-the-river hydropower plant toward an eco-
regulatory real subsumption capable of manipulating
natural conditions to enhance economic productiv-
ity. This shift was initiated by strategically incorpo-
rating the annual hydrologic regime at highland
lakes cum regulating reservoirs into the energy-pro-
duction system and then enhanced through human-
constructed storage capacity that maximized the eco-
nomic efficiency of combining seasonally produced
reserves with the river’s base flow.
This hydropeaking arrangement was particularly
valuable from 2004 to 2008, when energy producers
like Duke could forego contracting their production
in advance, instead leaving it available for specula-
tion on a short-term market where it could yield
substantially higher prices than those for contracted
production (Figure 3; Peru 1992). During periods
when these spot-market prices were highest (typic-
ally during annual dry seasons when hydropower
production was reduced), there were strong financial
10 French
Fi
gu
re
3.
Pr
ic
es
fo
r
en
er
gy
ge
ne
ra
ti
on
in
Pe
ru
,
20
01
–
20
09
:
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
co
nt
ra
ct
s
ve
rs
us
sp
ot
m
ar
ke
t.
So
ur
ce
:
D
at
a
fr
om
C
om
m
it
te
e
fo
r
th
e
Ec
on
om
ic
O
pe
ra
ti
on
of
th
e
N
at
io
na
l
In
te
rc
on
ne
ct
ed
En
er
gy
Sy
st
em
(C
O
ES
).
Webs and Flows 11
incentives to manage reservoirs like Lake Paron and
San Diego as intensively as possible.17
From Contradictions to Conflict
Whereas Duke’s license supported intensive man-
agement of Paron as a regulating reservoir, local geo-
morphologic conditions and water uses did not.
Specifically, two major material contradictions arose
between the licensed use regime and the socionatural
characteristics of the waterscape. The first of these
stemmed from the fact that some riverbanks and
infrastructure in the Paron–Llullan watershed were
unable to sustain the erosive power of discharges at
the upper end of the licensed range (5–8 m3/sec).
The second contradiction was linked to the volumet-
ric recharge of the lake during the annual wet season,
which varied with climatic factors18 and the lake’s
management and was not always sufficient to recuper-
ate the volume allotted annually for hydropower gen-
eration (35 106 m3; Figure 4).
Given these contradictions, soon after Duke
brought the San Diego reservoir into use, formal
complaints over Paron’s management arose. First, in
late 2001, the mayor of the Municipality of
Huaylas19 requested the revocation of Duke’s license
over damages to local roads, bridges, and irrigation
canals resulting from an “indiscriminate use of Lake
Paron’s waters in quantities greater than that of the
normal flow of the Llullan River” (Huaylas 2001).20
Similar complaints from local residents and the pot-
able water provider for Caraz, whose water treatment
infrastructure regularly suffered damages from large
discharges and increased levels of turbulence, contin-
ued over the ensuing years (e.g., EPS Chavın 2007).
These impacts were not surprising given that the
Paron–Llullan River’s streambed morphology and
local uses had been influenced by a flow regime in
which the average maximum discharge for at least
the several decades prior to the tunnel’s construction
(1953–1983) was merely 2.55 m3/sec and the max-
imum documented discharge (1983) was just 4.23
m3/sec (S&Z 1986). As the sustained complaints
emphasized, the river course and local infrastructure
could not withstand flows more than three times the
average maximum without significant damage.
In contrast to excessive discharges, the second
contradiction reflected too little water for local
needs. At the end of the 2002 dry season, the presi-
dent of the Paron–Llullan Irrigator Commission sub-
mitted a complaint to the state water authority over
crop losses due to insufficient water releases from the
lake, which violated the agreement to maintain a
permanent discharge of 1 m3/sec (Paron-Llullan
2002). Duke responded to such grievances by appeal-
ing to its licensed rights. For example, a year earlier
Figure 4. Annual recharge of Lake Paron, 1992–2008. Note: Black line represents the licensed annual discharge for hydropower
production (35 106m3). Source: Data from the National Water Authority (Glaciology and Hydrologic Resources Unit n.d.; Technical
Administration of the Huaraz Irrigation District n.d.).
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the company had justified emptying Paron’s entire
usable volume with the statement, “2001 was a dry
year that forced those in charge … to drain Lake
Paron to the authorized levels” (Duke 2002, 30).
The company went on to explain that the lack of
water was temporary and that by mid-2002 the lake
was mostly replenished. Nevertheless, the Irrigator
Commission’s complaint several months later sug-
gested that the problem, albeit temporary, was also
cyclical and prone to reoccur each dry season, when
water needs were greatest across sectors.
As the grievances illustrated, the company’s
intensive management, although supported by its
license, was incompatible with other elements of the
Paron waterscape. Moreover, the licensed discharges
that eroded riverbanks, damaged canals, and
exhausted local water supplies contradicted national-
level regulations governing Huascaran National Park
and the Peruvian energy and water sectors (e.g.,
MEM 1994). Had factors such as historical flow
rates, interannual recharge variability, and streambed
morphology been considered in the original license’s
design, a more balanced and adaptive discharge
regime might have resulted. As it was, neither these
aspects of the waterscape nor the potential impacts
of the licensed discharge regime on local water uses
figured in the license. By ignoring Paron’s preexist-
ing socionatural network and disregarding its poten-
tial to present obstacles to the lake’s subsumption by
the energy sector, policymakers awarded a license
destined to engender conflict.
As Duke adhered to its licensed rights despite the
impacts, diverse state authorities were drawn into the
waterscape to address the mounting complaints. From
2004 to 2006, Huascaran National Park and the
state’s Supervisory Agency for Energy Investment
(OSINERG) conducted formal inspections, confirming
reported damages and requesting a detailed EIA for
Duke’s use of Paron (e.g., OSINERG 2006). In 2006,
water-sector officials took stronger action, modifying
Duke’s license permanently by reducing the maximum
discharge rate from 8 to 5.5 m3/sec—still more than
double the historical average maximum flow (MINAG
2006). In August 2007, amidst continued complaints
over Duke’s management and increasing concerns that
the conflict might turn violent, the Autonomous
Authority of the Santa River Watershed (AACHS)—
nominally the basin’s highest water authority
(MINAG 1994a)—suspended Duke’s rights to use
Paron until Peru’s judiciary could rule on a request by
Caraz’s mayor to revoke Duke’s license (AACHS
2007).21 Following this order, the discharge rate was
limited to 2.63 m3/sec for local uses until the matter
could be settled in court (MINAG 2007). After
appeals by both sides, the case passed into the higher
echelons of the legal system. Then in July 2008, with
the legal decision still pending, Duke began discharges
in excess of 2.63 m3/sec. The local coalition—consist-
ing of members of the Cruz de Mayo campesino com-
munity, the Paron–Llullan Irrigators Commission, and
residents of Caraz22—took swift action, occupying the
lake’s infrastructure and fixing the discharge at 1 m3/
sec (Table 1). In 2017, local residents still guard the
lake and its discharge infrastructure in the absence of
any permanent resolution to the conflict.
The Matter of Agency
Over the nine years since the coalition’s occupa-
tion of Lake Paron, the web of actors connected
through the waterscape has continued to expand.
This growth in the network has been most obvious
in relation to the social actors who became involved
as the case garnered interest from an array of politi-
cians, journalists, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, including Peru’s former First Lady Nadine
Heredia and the Episcopal Commission for Social
Action (CEAS).23 Whereas the attention of many
such actors has been fleeting, the involvement of
advocates like CEAS has endured and helped to
shape the trajectory of the resolution process. Given
the conflict’s duration coupled with structural
changes within Peru’s bureaucracies, a diverse and
shifting cast of state institutions and functionaries
Table 1. Lake Paron’s discharge regimes
Average annual
maximum
(1953–1983)
Legal
license
(1994–2006)
Legal license
(2006–2007;
2011–present)
AACHS
suspension
(2007–2011)
Rate set by local
coalition after
2008 seizure
Technical
recommendation
for maximum
Discharge rate
(m3/sec)
2.55 8 5.5 2.63 1 4
Note: AACHS¼Autonomous Authority of the Santa River Watershed.
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has also engaged in the resolution efforts, from con-
flict resolution experts to top-level ministers.
Yet, although varied and influential social actors
have come and gone over years of conflict resolution
efforts, the forces impelling action have most often
been natural processes and their socionatural entangle-
ments. Next, I highlight several important moments in
the conflict’s evolution to illustrate how agency—
rather than being wielded unilaterally by powerful
social actors—has instead emerged within the sociona-
tural network of the engineered, but ultimately unpre-
dictable and uncontrollable, Paron waterscape.
The Agency of Matter
During the wet seasons of 2008–2009 and
2009–2010, abundant precipitation coupled with the
local coalition’s decision to maintain the discharge
at 1 m3/sec caused Lake Paron to fill to levels that
forced repeated efforts to resolve the conflict. The
lake first surpassed the maximum “safe” level of
4,185 masl in February 2009, leading the National
Water Authority to order controlled discharges
(ANA 2009a). The local coalition refused, however,
insisting that the registry “error” from 1994 titling
Lake Paron to the energy sector first be annulled.
This did not occur, and the lake level continued to
rise, hovering around 4,190 masl for the remainder
of the 2008–2009 wet season before dropping grad-
ually during the dry season.
Throughout 2009 the discharge remained fixed at
1 m3/sec, and with heavy rains late in the year, the
lake level quickly rose, reaching almost 4,195 masl
by the end of the year. With only 5m of freeboard
remaining and significant seepage passing through
the morainal dam, the National Water Authority
again pressed for controlled discharges. Yet despite
the growing hazard, the local coalition refused to
cooperate while the titling error remained unresolved.
With the lake in this precarious condition, on 3
January 2010, natural forces intervened further when
a 5.7 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter
roughly 10 km north of Paron, struck the region
(Tavera, Bernal, and Torres 2010). The lake’s satu-
rated dam survived, but the earthquake accentuated
public concern over the growing risk. Soon afterward
a presidential decree declared a national state of
emergency at Lake Paron, mandating controlled dis-
charges (Presidency of Council of Ministers 2010).
Yet the steadfast coalition refused even this
executive order, with some residents proclaiming
that they “would rather die in an avalanche than of
thirst” (Untiveros 2011, 9). Finally, in early
February, a second executive order annulled the
erroneous property title and returned Lake Paron to
Huascaran National Park (Ministry of the
Environment 2010). Several days later, after the
minister of agriculture visited Paron and assured the
local community that its priorities would determine
the lake’s management in the future (Cordova
2010), the coalition permitted the lake’s lowering
for the first time since the 2008 occupation
(Peralta 2010).
The Matter of Politics
For many observers, the lake’s lowering in early
2010 followed by collaborative management of its
volume throughout the 2010–2011 rainy season
marked the conflict’s resolution. Nevertheless, nei-
ther the annulled titling error nor the temporarily
successful management efforts addressed the principal
drivers of the conflict. As described earlier, these
were rooted in the details of Duke’s water license,
which remained the subject of an ongoing legal suit.
In May 2011, Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal
finally ruled on the 2007 suspension of Duke’s
license (Peru 2011), overturning it and upholding
Duke’s right to discharge 35 106 m3 from Lake
Paron at rates up to 5.5 m3/sec, despite the fact that
experts had recommended a maximum discharge rate
of 4 m3/sec (ANA 2010). The high court’s decision,
which undermined such technical recommendations
as well as the minister of agriculture’s assurances
from 2010, focused on jurisdictional details and pro-
cedural errors in the suspension process and failed to
consider the history of local complaints and the
license’s contradiction of other national legislation.
Most important, the ruling utterly ignored the mat-
ter of nature at the lake and the recurrent challenges
it posed to the licensed discharge regime through
the variable hydrologic conditions and geomorph-
ology of the Paron basin. The local coalition decried
the ruling as the result of state politics defending
“the interests of economic power” and as “an affront
to the life and dignity of the population” (Huaylas,
Cruz de Mayo, and Paron–Llullan 2011). Local
actors refused to honor the ruling, and the deci-
sion’s principal outcome, besides upholding Duke’s
formal rights, was to spur the dissolution of the
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multisectoral committee that had managed the
lake’s level since early 2010 (ANA 2011). As a
result, the ruling assured that the conflict would
continue to ebb and flow with the volume of the
lake for years to come.
Since the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling, ad hoc
and protracted negotiations have repeatedly been
required to manage the lake’s level (French
2016). Yet despite the frequency and costs of such
interventions, there has yet to be a formal initiative
to permanently modify Duke’s license in favor of
a more adaptive arrangement responsive to the
highly variable and unpredictable socionature of the
Paron waterscape.
Conclusion
Through one critical optic, the Paron conflict can
be understood as a double movement consisting of
the subsumption of the lake’s waters by the hydro-
power sector—a process that generated basic contra-
dictions between social reproduction and economic
production in the waterscape—and local society’s
ensuing efforts to re-embed the lake’s vital flows in
a system of customary use and control (Polanyi
[1944] 2001). This is a perspective common to
political ecology, and in its very framing, the agency
of human actors and the economy they create is
prominent, whereas nature merely provides a mater-
ial basis for human intention and action.
Responding to critiques of such anthropocentric
approaches, this article couples political–economic
analysis with ANT-inspired attention to how materi-
ality has fundamentally shaped the web of actors in
the Paron waterscape and the processes leading up
to and following the energy sector’s attempted sub-
sumption of the lake’s flows. This approach provides
a more symmetrical perspective on socionatural
dynamics, illustrating how a fuller understanding of
agency results from detailed description of the net-
worked historical geographical processes through
which power emerges. The case underscores the lim-
its of social power, showing that, although feats of
engineering and infrastructure development suc-
ceeded in making the lake and its hydrologic regime
work for the hydropower sector, the energy econo-
my’s subsumption of the lake and its flows falls far
short of complete control over the resulting sociona-
ture. Instead, nature is always an integral and active
partner in coproducing the waterscape—at times
inspiring and enabling human enterprise and in
other moments constraining human intentions
and power.
In an applied sense, the analysis presented illus-
trates how little systematic attention has been paid
to nature’s role in the emergence and persistence of
the Paron conflict, highlighting a broader need for
recognition of materiality’s constitutive character in
shaping resource economies and politics in concert
with human endeavor. Such awareness is vital to
understanding how specific socionatural processes
and outcomes generate the tensions and contradictions
between social reproduction and economic production
that underlie many intractable socioenvironmental
conflicts under capitalist development. In elucidating
these contradictions, a network approach can help
political ecology deliver the critical, cross-disciplin-
ary analyses that originally defined the field, while
supporting transformative politics based in more just
social relations and less Promethean relations with
nature (cf. Loftus 2011).
Despite advocating careful attention to environ-
mental determinants, it is important to emphasize
that the approach taken here refutes rather than
reinforces the excesses of environmental determin-
ism. As the case study illustrates, instead of a power
wielded by individual actors—either social or
natural—agency is an outcome emerging from the
specific relations of environmental and social factors
connected within networks. For example, it would
be wrong to suggest that the earthquake that helped
impel the resolution of the titling error and the sub-
sequent lowering of the lake in early 2010 alone
forced these outcomes. Instead, the conjuncture of
a lake filled beyond its maximum safe level, the pres-
ence of lives and infrastructure in the path of a
potential GLOF, widespread public awareness of the
conflict at the lake, and a legal process for correcting
the title error already in process all contributed to
swift action after the earthquake. A key point here
is the critical importance of thorough empirical
investigation in assembling the intricate and shifting
socionatural webs in which the dynamics of agency
and action evolve. Absent careful empiricism, the
traps of determinism—both environmental and
social—may plague the networks and the explana-
tions that their structures and dynamics suggest.
As a final point, though the webs and flows
described in this article reflect the socionatural
hybridization inherent to our contemporary world,
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they also maintain, in a semantic and ontological
sense, the fundamental nature–society binary that
many scholars—and proponents of ANT in particu-
lar—have struggled to overcome. I believe that
acknowledging this persistent divide is unavoidable,
because although I advocate careful theoretical and
empirical attention to processes of hybridization, I
argue that continued recognition of this dualism is
necessary to represent the intentional and incomplete
fusions that often characterize human relations with
nature. In light of the enduring ontological challenges
this separation presents, the potential for network con-
ceptualizations to capture and convey the complex
assemblages of social and natural actors and the hybri-
dized socionatures they produce is all the more vital.
Thus, rather than retiring ANT from political ecology’s
toolkit and neglecting its contributions and conceptual
insights, I suggest that we develop more thorough the-
oretical and empirical understandings of socionatural
networks to enrich political ecology’s attention to the
matter of nature and the hybrid dynamics through
which agency and power emerge.
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Notes
1. In an effort to avoid semantic confusion, I refrain
from using the ANT term actants and instead use
the term actors to represent the full spectrum of
social and natural phenomena (i.e., humans,
technological artifacts, biophysical forms and
processes, geologic forces, etc.).
2. Castree’s (2003) observation of this challenge within
geography still holds for the discipline and for
broader society: “Since it is scarcely plausible that
physical geographers will be responsive to such
ontological neologisms as ‘imbroglios’ and ‘quasi-
objects’ (and who can blame them?!), it is likely any
meaningful reunion of geography’s two ‘halves’ will
be achieved within existing binary mindsets” (206).
3. Rather than embracing Malthusian thinking, I
concur with Benton (1989): “To recognize that
specific social and economic forms of life encounter
real natural limits is to concede nothing to natural-
limits conservatism” (79).
4. Many of these materials are not available in public
repositories or archives but were obtained directly
from respondents and may be requested from the
author. Due to confidentiality considerations, only
materials within the public domain have been
explicitly referenced here.
5. Given space constraints, I refer readers to several
complementary review articles rather than excluding
much excellent scholarship by citing only a
few examples.
6. See previous note.
7. The Cordillera Blanca is undergoing rapid glacial
recession, having lost more than 30 percent of its
glaciated area since the 1970s. This glacier loss
contributes to geophysical hazards and is affecting local
and regional hydrologic regimes in diverse ways (see,
e.g., Mark et al. 2017). Despite the fact that the Paron
watershed has a relatively high percentage of glacier-
covered surface area (39 percent in 2009; see Baraer
et al. 2012), annual precipitation remains the critical
factor for Lake Paron’s water supply, with glacial melt
playing a much less significant role. Although concerns
over future water scarcity linked to climate change
have been mentioned by local actors, these were never
identified as a significant driver of the conflict.
8. The term watershed refers to the hydrographic unit
describing an area that collects and channels surface
water, groundwater, and precipitation toward a
common outlet. The term is distinct from waterscape,
which conceptualizes a network encompassing the
physical watershed as well as the diverse socionatural
processes linked to and through it.
9. A GLOF results when the morainal or ice dam
containing a glacial lake fails, allowing the
impounded lake to drain. Processes including erosion,
seismic activity, and avalanches often trigger GLOFs.
Lake Paron’s capacity (79.5 106m3) coupled with
uncertainty over the stability of its morainal dam
made it particularly menacing as a GLOF hazard.
10. Measured by Electroperu at a stream-stage gauge
at 4,100 masl on the Paron River. This volume
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is slightly greater than the lake’s discharge alone,
because it includes runoff from an additional 7 km2
(S&Z 1986). Post-1983 data are not included
because the lake’s discharge was then manipulated
by human engineering.
11. The 1986 recommendation to use Lake Paron
as a regulating reservoir predated the introduction
of EIAs to Peru’s environmental policy in 1990 (see
Legislative Decree No. 613-1990).
12. Despite multiple inquiries regarding this titling error,
its history was never explained definitively. By 2002,
Duke reported that it was working to correct the
error (Duke 2002), but the annulment of the title
would not occur until 2010.
13. Interview with former Duke employee, 21 December
2010, Huaraz, Peru.
14. Combined average for August streamflows measured
at stream-stage gauges located on the Los Cedros
tributary (1,990 masl) and at La Balsa (1,880 masl)
on the Santa River. The combination of these
volumes gives the most accurate measure available for
the streamflow at the CDPHP intake (1,807 masl).
15. Interview with Duke engineer, 3 June 2011,
Huallanca, Peru.
16. See previous note.
17. From 2006 to 2008, Peru’s government enacted
various policies to regulate the short-term market
and control its elevated prices (e.g., Law No. 28832;
D.U. 049-2008; Peru 2006).
18. Of climate-related factors, precipitation levels affect
the lake’s recharge most substantially, although glacial
melt rates also contribute. Although the El
Ni~no–Southern Oscillation phenomenon influences
both factors, its impacts vary nonuniformly between
events in this part of the Andes; that is, precipitation
and melt levels increase during some El Ni~no years and
decrease during others (see Vuille, Kaser, and
Juen 2008).
19. Huaylas is the province in which both Caraz and
Lake Paron are located.
20. All translations by the author.
21. Interview with former President of the Directorate of
the AACHS, 8 February 2011, Huaraz, Peru. Notably,
in contrast to many recent socioenvironmental
conflicts in Peru, no violence has occurred in the
Paron case.
22. After the occupation at the lake, the local coalition
would receive sustained public support from the
Mayor of the Municipality of Huaylas and the
potable-water provider EPS Chavın.
23. On Heredia’s involvement, see “Carta de Nadine
Heredia” (2011).
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